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Problem Description
Every day 6,000 bus journeys are run in the mid-size Italian city of
Bologna, serving 250,000 customers. Large part of the service cost is
publicly subsidized.
This is quite a common situation where two players are involved in a
service provision:
An Agency, who designs and contracts the service;
An Operator, who provides the service.
Some questions arise:
What is the relationship between Agency and Operator?
How does the Agency control the service provided by the Operator?
Can the Agency trust the information provided by the Operator about
its own performance?
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Problem Description
The Operator reports its daily performance to the Agency. If the
contractual obligations are not met, the Operator receives a fine from
the Agency.
The issue in this scheme is the informative asymmetry between the
Operator and the Agency.
The Agency needs a control procedure to check the correctness of the
information received from the Operator.
For each skipped journey that is truthfully reported, there is a small
fine f .
For each skipped journey that is NOT reported, there is a large fine
F , if discovered.
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Agency - Operator: a non-cooperative game
The described problem can be modeled through a (Three-stage)
Noncooperative Game.
1 The Agency establishes the details of the contract.
2 The Operator decides on how much to invest in service provision.
3 Simultaneously, the Operator chooses to what extent to report
truthfully, while the Agency chooses the effort to be incurred in
controlling services.
It is easy to show that a Nash Equilibrium exists, i.e., an equilibrium
in which none of the players has any incentive to deviate from the
decided strategy.
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Agency - Operator: a non-cooperative game: Phase 1
Agency chooses fines.
About the definition of f and F , note that if the Agency sets F too
large, it would be prohibitive for the Operator to pay it and it would
bankrupt, in which case the Agency would have to organize a new
auction to select a new operator.
Such a consequence is deemed extreme, and unrealistic, hence
undesirable. Terminating a contract early may have negative
reputation effects for the city.
Such a “bankrupt” cost, which includes the expected legal costs up-to
the possible break of the service contract, is quite difficult to
evaluate, we indicate it as C .
Finally, there is a (small) possibility of an error by the Agency in
detecting as missing a service that has instead been provided.
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Agency - Operator: a non-cooperative game: Phase 2
Operator chooses investment in service provision.
In this stage the Operator decides how much to invest to obtain and
maintain buses, hire and train drivers, and all the other aspects of
service provision.
We call this budget decision bop, which represents the invested money
per service.
Roughly, the more is invested in bus provision the more likely it is to
provide a given service successfully.
The percentage q(bop) is to be interpreted as the probability that the
Operator provides a given service.
We assume that q(0) = 0, and q(bop)→ 1 when bop →∞.
However, a finite investment cannot guarantee that q(bop) = 1
because there are always factors outside the Operator’s control.
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Agency - Operator: a non-cooperative game: Phase 3
Operator chooses honesty level; Agency chooses effort to control.
In this stage both players compete in a single shot noncooperative
game.
The Operator decides what fraction of non-performed services t to
report honestly. Hence, a fraction 1− t of missed services are not
reported as missing.
Concurrently, the Agency decides the budget per service ba allocated
to controlling activities. Since the control is done by placing
employees in the street, it is labor intensive, so ba mainly consists of
wages paid to those employees.
The control procedure defines a function p(ba) that maps the budget
devoted to control to the probability that a service is checked.
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Agency - Operator: a non-cooperative game: Phase 3
Game equilibrium:
The operator reports skipped journeys with probability t. Its payoff (per
journey) is:
pi3OP = −f (1− q)t − F (1− q)(1− t)p
Where 1− q is the probability of skipping a journey.
The optimal operator pure strategy is declaring missing journeys (t = 1)
when p > f /F and not declaring (t = 0) when p < f /F .
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Agency - Operator: Checking probability
!"!!#
$"!!#
%"!!#
&"!!#
'"!!#
("!!#
)"!!#
!# (# $!# $(# %!# %(# &!#
!"
#!
$%
&'
()
*+
,-
,%
.%/
0(
(
"+1*2(
%#*+,-.+//0.1#
&#*+,-.+//0.1#
'#*+,-.+//0.1#
p(bA) is computed by algorithmically solving an optimization model.
In other words, the better the control procedure the higher the
probability of discovering a missing service at a given budget ba.
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Optimized Performance Control
Problem: given a budget of working hours, check as many journeys as
possible. A profit is associated with the check of each journey.
Frequency check: counts the number of buses observed at a bus stop.
For each stop, a few waiting times are defined, and a profit is defined
depending on the number of journeys that can be observed during
that time.
Controllers can move in the town by riding the buses or by walking.
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Optimized Performance Control
More formally, we are given a sparse directed graph G = (V ,A), where V
is the set of bus stops and A the set of (bus or walking) connections.
Each arc a has a positive travel time da.
Stops s ∈ V have associated waiting times t which give a profit pits ,
depending on the journey observed during t.
Given K controllers, each of them working Wk hours, we want to
route them in the town so as to maximize the profit of the collected
information.
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Optimized Performance Control
A MILP model for optimized performance control:
We use binary variables y t,ks to denote the check of stop s during time
period t of length τ by controller k. Integer variables zka denote the
number of times arc a is traversed by controller k .
max
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈Ts
pitsy
t,k
s
(working hours)
∑
a∈A
daz
k
a +
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈Ts
τ ts y
t,k
s ≤Wk k ∈ K
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Optimized Performance Control
(office visit)
∑
a∈δ+(0)
zka ≥ 1 k ∈ K
(no duplication)
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈Ts
y t,ks ≤ 1 s ∈ S
(balance)
∑
a∈δ+(s)
zka =
∑
a∈δ−(s)
zka ≥
∑
t∈Ts
y t,ks s ∈ S , k ∈ K
(subtour elimination)
∑
a∈δ−(Σ)
zka ≥
∑
t∈Ts
y t,ks k ∈ K ,Σ ⊂ V , s ∈ Σ, 0 /∈ Σ
(additional constraints)
y t,ks ∈ {0, 1} s ∈ S , t ∈ T , k ∈ K
zka ∈ Z+ a ∈ A, k ∈ K .
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Optimized Performance Control
(balance)
∑
a∈δ+(s)
zka =
∑
a∈δ−(s)
zka ≥
∑
t∈Ts
y t,ks s ∈ S , k ∈ K
Note that we work with a sparse graph, and the shortest path between
nodes is not computed in a pre-processing phase. Some nodes (blue) are
crossed but not checked.
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y t,ki = 1
y t,kj = 0
y t,kk = 1
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Separation
We use separation to tackle the exponentially many subtour elimination
constraints. Given a fractional solution (y¯ , z¯), define a max-flow problem
for each k by setting the arc capacities to z¯ka , ∀a ∈ A.
Let fs be the value of the max flow from the office (0) to s and Σ a set of
vertices, including s, corresponding to a min-cut. If we have that∑
t∈Ts
y¯ t,ks > fs ,
we add the corresponding violated constraint∑
a∈δ−(Σ)
zka ≥
∑
t∈Ts
y t,ks .
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Algorithm
Models with about 100 nodes can be solved through Branch-and-Cut with
CPLEX12. For larger graphs, we get good bounds but it is hard to
produce feasible solutions. This is because when we add a subtour
elimination constraint, the solver easily finds an “equivalent” solution by
re-routing on non-checked (blue) nodes.∑
a∈δ−(Σ)
zka ≥
∑
t∈Ts
y t,ks
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Algorithm
Models with about 100 nodes can be solved through Branch-and-Cut with
CPLEX12. For larger graphs, we get good bounds but it is hard to
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Algorithm
To obtain good feasible solutions we designed a MIP-heuristic that uses
information from the current fractional solution:
consider a reduced problem restricted to nodes s having an associated
ys larger then a given threshold;
define an associated complete graph G˜ ;
solve the model on G˜ for a limited amount of time;
map the solution back to G .
The algorithm is executed during the Branch-and-Cut with a specified
frequency.
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Case study: applying the Model to Bologna
We focused on 29 high frequency lines (average time between two
consecutive journeys of at most 30 minutes), serving the 81.9% of the
total operator passengers and visiting 1104 stops.
The graph G = (S ∪{0},A) is derived from the real network by considering
only arcs corresponding to existing network connections (i.e., G is sparse).
There are two kinds of such arcs, namely:
bus connections and
pedestrian connections.
In total, |A| ' 25000
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Case study: bus connections
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Case study: overall graph (bus and pedestrian connections)
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Case study: Iterated Control
The schedule of the controllers is optimized day-by-day through the
deterministic model.
In order to discount recently collected information, the profits associated
with lines and stops are modified as follows: pis = pis(1− 11+int ), where int
is the interval of time (in days) since the last visit to the stop.
Figure: Two consecutive working days for two controllers.
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Case study: solving the model
All algorithms were coded in C and tested on a single core of a
core i5− 650 PC at 3.20GHz and 8GB ram under linux with a time limit
of 2 hours. We used CPLEX 12.2 as MIP solver.
We considered 6 basic scenarios with 2, 3 and 4 controllers, each one
working 3 or 6 hours. Solutions are compared with those produced by an
iterated greedy randomized algorithm.
controllers working hours gap nodes cuts heur gap
2 3 3.66 20600 6222 19.54
3 3 3.67 6100 2702 22.98
4 3 4.42 3500 1370 22.54
2 6 2.22 6700 5398 19.46
3 6 2.83 3870 2756 21.69
4 6 2.39 2900 2093 20.96
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Case study: check probability
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p(bA) is computed through the model. Effort bA is measured in working
hours wi per controller i , so p(bA) = p(w) with w = (w1, . . . ,wk).
Experiments tell us that we have p(bA) = p(W ) with W =
∑k
i=1 wi .
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Case study: feedback on game
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By considering the current fines: f = 250 and F = 5000 euro, we need to
have p > 5% to make honesty the optimal pure strategy for the operator
(t = 1). This can be obtained with 24 hours of optimized control.
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Optimization Feedback on the Game equilibrium
In a first phase of the study we assumed that the fines F and f were
known. This allowed us to compute the optimal percentage of
services to be checked by computing the game equilibrium (stage 3).
In the contract design phase F and f are to be defined, and we
compute their optimal values from game equilibrium (stages 1, 2, 3).
We define one basic scenario as follows:
number of lines: 29
frequency: 6 / h
people affected by one missed service 50
driver cost: 40e/ h
controller cost: 50e/ h
bus cost: 20e/ h
average service duration: 50 min
daily services: 1,740
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Optimization Feedback on the Game equilibrium
The main input parameter of the game we can vary is the expected
cost C for the Agency of a broken contract (due to a too large fine F
to the operator).
We report the game equilibria for some possible values of C .
% services hours of
C F f to be checked control
90,000 49,258 1,001 2.03 7
41,000 22,440 634 2.82 11
24,000 13,135 465 3.54 15
10,000 5,473 279 5.11 25
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Conclusions
We considered the problem of an Agency who contracts a public
transport service to a private Operator.
We proposed an optimized control strategy based on the solution of a
price collecting routing model. The model solution describes the
working day of the controllers, who will check the service at bus stops.
The output of the model was used, as a feedback on a game
theoretical model, to evaluate the optimal level of effort to be spent
in the checks.
At the service contract renewal, the game theoretical/optimization
approach will support the design of the new contract.
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